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ABSTRACT
This paper illustrates how concepts of mental disorder have been deployed 
to medicalize negative emotions and, thereby, weaken the political agency of 
some individuals. First, I theorise the link between political agency and emotions, 
arguing that effective political action entails the transformation of emotions into 
public issues. Using the British referendum on membership in the EU as a case 
study, I then examine how medically loaded terms and rhetoric were used to 
describe suffering after the vote. Finally, I argue that this generated conditions 
that interrupted or even reversed the transformation of subjective experiences 
into politically meaningful issues.
KEYWORDS arendt; political emotions; political agency; eU referendum; Brexit
Introduction
Emotions occupy a central role both in political theory and practice. The 
so-called affective turn has been ongoing for more than a decade, engaging 
political theorists who seek to rehabilitate the role of emotions in politics (e.g. 
Ferry & Kingston, 2008; Goodwin, Jasper, & Poletta, 2001; Hoggett & Thompson, 
2012). Whatever influence this academic debate has had on politics, it seems 
that emotions have, as one commentator put it, been ‘emancipated’ (Wouters, 
2012), at least in a certain sense. Today, we expect our political leaders to display 
emotions publicly during certain events.1 And it is now a matter of course for 
politicians to appeal explicitly to the hearts as well as the minds of voters, in an 
apparent acknowledgment of the legitimate role that emotions play in politics 
(e.g. McIntosh, 2015). It is not surprising then that it has seemingly become 
more acceptable for average citizens to show emotions in particular social and 
political contexts as well.2
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The emancipation of emotions has, arguably, increased the political agency 
of individuals whose attempts to participate in political discourse have long 
been dismissed or undermined on the basis that they are overly emotional 
and irrational, including women, black people, and members of the working 
class. The prevailing conditions seem to limit, though not prevent, attempts 
to delegitimize and disempower by appeal to the reason-emotion dichotomy. 
In this paper, I will theorize how another, increasingly influential dichotomy 
impacts political agency, namely, the dichotomy between healthy and disor-
dered emotions.
Using examples from British newspaper articles, political commentary, and 
mental health blogs published in the period immediately before and after the 
referendum on British membership in the EU on June 23, 2016, I will illustrate 
how ideas of mental disorder have been used to medicalize the emotions of 
citizens and, thereby, weaken their political agency.
I begin by outlining the connection between political agency and emotions, 
drawing on Hannah Arendt’s ideas about political action. Emotions, I argue, must 
be transformed into a public issue to become a basis for effective political action. 
Within liberal democracies, the resources and opportunities required for such 
transformations are widespread, if unequally distributed and accessible. I then 
proceed to examine the treatment of negative emotions in the post-referendum 
discourse. In the aftermath of the vote, there were reports that people were 
supposedly flooding psychiatric clinics to receive care for their Brexit-related 
emotional suffering. Mental health experts and journalists dubbed this suffering 
‘Brexit anxiety’. They warned that the anger, fear, and sadness that many people 
felt – especially those who had voted to remain – were incipient symptoms 
of mental disorder. To avoid full-blown disorder, people had to manage these 
emotions carefully. An effective means of management, according to numerous 
therapists and employers, was for people to recognize their powerlessness in the 
face of political events, and focus on their private lives. Some pundits also seized 
on the idea of Brexit anxiety, but for a different purpose, namely, to ridicule, 
shame, and delegitimize the actions of those who continue to oppose Brexit. In 
conclusion, I argue that the case of Brexit demonstrates how concepts of mental 
disorder in political discourse may interrupt or even reverse the transformation 
of emotions into public issues.
Arendt, political agency, and emotion
Political agency in this paper will refer to the individual’s capacity to act in con-
cert with other people to shape or respond to a public issue. This definition 
draws on the thought of Hannah Arendt, according to whom power arises from 
action in concert. In this view, the power generated in collective action can 
be used to establish and preserve political institutions and laws, but also to 
challenge, reform, and destroy them (Arendt, 1961, p. 153; 1972, p. 56). The 
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term public issue is owed to Mills (1959, p. 187), and refers to a problem that 
an individual shares with others and which can only be solved through struc-
tural change on a group, community, or societal level.3 It also fits well with and 
clarifies Arendt’s central claim that political action always concerns ‘men in the 
plural’, never ‘man in the singular’ (Arendt, [1958] 1998, p. 4).4
As I indicated above, I am interested in how the medicalization of negative 
emotions impacts our capacity to take political action.5 Since this presumes that 
there is a connection between emotions and political agency, I should clarify 
what this connection is. However, Arendt is not exactly famous for her odes 
to emotional politics. Quite the contrary. Among scholars of political emotion 
Arendt is perhaps best known for her critique of emotion. They have taken 
her to claim that emotions ought to be kept in the private sphere, away from 
the public realm in which politics occurs. I have argued against this interpre-
tation at length elsewhere (Degerman, 2016). Basically, I claim that Arendt’s 
worries about emotions in politics are rooted in an idiosyncratic understand-
ing of emotion as a combination of wordless, visceral reactions and radically 
subjective experiences. These experiences are, according to Arendt, inherently 
hidden within the heart’s darkness, and attempts to externalize and use them 
in the public sphere have in the past engendered a destructive fixation with 
authenticity.
Many of us today have a more expansive understanding of what an emotion 
is than did Arendt. While we might agree with her that subjective feeling is an 
essential part of an emotion, contemporary philosophers have convincingly 
argued that other components – such as judgments, words, and deliberate 
actions – are also part of what constitutes an emotion (Lupton, 1998; Reddy, 
2001; Solomon, 2004). Why then am I using Arendt to outline the connection 
between political agency and emotion?
Despite its limitations, Arendt’s thinking contains an insight that is frequently 
obscured in contemporary debates on political emotions and action. Namely, 
emotions and other subjective experiences are not inherently political. They 
must be turned into something political, that is, into something that we can 
share and act on with others. As Arendt puts it in The Human Condition:
… the greatest forces of intimate life – the passions of the heart, the thoughts of 
the mind, the delights of the senses – lead an uncertain shadowy kind of existence 
unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it 
were, into a shape to fit them for public appearance. (Arendt, [1958] 1998, p. 50)
She suggests that such transformations are facilitated by a common world 
– a shared world of things, speech, and relationships (Arendt, [1958] 1998, pp. 
50, 168). The common world is a central condition of political action in Arendt’s 
work, much of which is dedicated to exploring the relationship between the 
two. However, she does not pay much attention, either in The Human Condition 
or in later works, to how the common world enables the transformation of 
subjective experiences into a shape ‘fit for public appearance’. Instead, she is 
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preoccupied primarily with defining the proper limits of the public contra the 
private sphere, almost as though their mere existence guaranteed the possi-
bility of political action. This has led some critics to assert that Arendt simply 
presumes the existence of ready-made political agents who are ready to act 
as long as there is a public sphere. McNay (2014), for example, accuses Arendt 
of overlooking many of the obstacles to political action that exist within the 
public sphere, and their capacity to affect people differently depending on 
gender, race, class, and capacity. Individuals and groups who find themselves 
surrounded by such obstacles often end up internalizing injustice as negative 
emotions directed at their individual lives, and end up blaming themselves for 
their misery. McNay rightly observes that by ‘being incorporated in this manner, 
the social origins of suffering are obscured and are experienced instead as the 
fault of the individual’ (p. 115).
This criticism is partly justified. But some of Arendt’s earlier work suggests 
she understood how disempowering the inability to transform subjective expe-
riences into a shape fit for ‘public appearance’ could be. One of the books that 
supports this claim is Arendt’s ([1957] 1997) biography of Rahel Varnhagen – a 
Jewish woman, who at the turn of the eighteenth century hosted one of Berlin’s 
most popular salons.6 With the rise of Napoleon and antisemitism, Varnhagen 
fell out of favor with high society, and she spent most of her remaining life 
trying to regain her standing. Arendt’s biography focuses on this latter part of 
Varnhagen’s life. The work can be read as the tragic story of a Jewess who in her 
single-minded and self-centered pursuit to improve her status in society failed 
to understand the connection between her personal suffering and the political 
problems of Jews in general.
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt identifies the same tendency towards 
individualization more broadly among the pre-war European Jews. There she 
links it more explicitly to the structural problems faced by Jews who sought 
assimilation. They were required on the one hand to distinguish themselves from 
the average Jews and their cultural and racial taint. On the other, they also had 
to distinguish themselves from non-Jews to prove that they had something to 
contribute to the society that admitted them and were thus worthy of its pro-
tection (Arendt, 1958, pp. 65, 66). The very possibility of assimilation, in effect, 
entailed a recognition of individual responsibility and a denial of the political 
meaning of the suffering of Jews. Reflecting on this, Arendt says: ‘The adage, “a 
man in the street and a Jew at home,” was bitterly realized: political problems 
were distorted to the point of pure perversion when Jews tried to solve them 
by means of inner experience and private emotions’ (p. 67).7 The grounds for 
solidarity and effective political action among Jews were thus severely under-
mined (pp. 117, 118), if not completely destroyed (p. 120). They did not lose the 
capacity to speak about their problems as such of course; Arendt observes that 
during the many years of persecution, the Jews developed a rich cultural life 
which helped them to survive (1968, pp. 12, 13). What they lost or lacked were 
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the concepts and resources to transform their problems into a political shape, 
that is, into public issues.
These examples illustrate that without the capacity to relate our subjective 
experiences to worldly conditions – matters that we share with others – political 
action becomes impossible because it appears that there is nothing that we 
can act on together.
Transforming negative emotions into public issues
The notion that political action entails a transformation of emotion resonates 
with how other political thinkers and activists have described the experience 
of acting politically. Several have used terms closely related to transformation, 
such as ‘transition’, ‘transmutation’, and ‘channeling’. These are often applied to 
anger, although I think the concept of transformation is applicable to at least 
all negative emotions. Notably, Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King both 
spoke in these terms. Gandhi (1999, p. 252) once said: ‘I have learnt through 
bitter experience the one supreme lesson to conserve my anger and as heat 
conserved is transmuted into energy, even so our anger controlled can be trans-
muted into a power which can move the world’. In an apparently matching spirit, 
Martin Luther King (1986, p. 49) relayed his experiences of dealing with negative 
emotions: ‘As my sufferings mounted I soon realized that there were two ways 
that I could respond to my situation: either to react with bitterness or seek to 
transform the suffering into a creative force’.
Leaders within the second wave feminist movement also spoke in terms sug-
gesting that women’s negative emotions had to be deliberately transformed into 
something political. The civil rights activist and black feminist writer Audre Lorde 
spoke eloquently – and passionately – about this need: ‘Every woman has a well-
stocked arsenal of anger potentially useful against those oppressions, personal 
and institutional, which brought that anger into being. Focused with precision 
it can become a powerful source of energy serving progress and change’ (1984, 
p. 127; emphasis mine). However, Lorde observed: ‘Most women have not devel-
oped the tools for facing anger constructively’ (p. 130). Consciousness-raising 
sessions were central to developing these tools (at least among white women), 
that is, concepts and relationships that allowed women not just to speak, but 
to be heard and seen where they had previously been silent and invisible. As 
another activist-scholar put it, these sessions enabled women ‘to translate their 
individual feelings of “unfreedom” into a collective consciousness’ (Freeman, 
1973, p. 800). McNay (2014, p. 115) similarly describes how consciousness-raising 
groups translated ‘personal experiences of suffering into an impersonal analysis 
of [women’s] subordination’. The consciousness-raising groups provided space, 
affiliations, and concepts – empowering factors – which permitted women to 
transform subjective experiences into a public issue. Thereby, women’s indi-
vidual experiences were imbued with shared meaning, and their concerted 
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action was directed toward specific problems, such as workplace discrimination, 
sexism, etc.
Nussbaum (2016), in her recent book Anger and Forgiveness, describes a 
comparable, but narrower, process of moving from anger to political action, 
which she calls transition. It is worth distinguishing briefly between her idea 
of emotional transition and my idea of emotional transformation. For whereas 
Nussbaum’s transition implies that the original emotion has been left behind, 
my Arendtian concept of transformation presupposes little about the mental life 
of the actor, except that the actor herself believes that she has experienced an 
emotion and that her understanding of its basis has shifted into shared terms. 
Transformation in my rendering, hence, permits the emotion to persist and 
continue to fuel the action. By contrast, Nussbaum demands that the anger 
be purged and replaced by thoughts about the common good, a demanding 
requirement with few evident benefits.8
The kinds of empowering factors that were present in the feminist con-
sciousness-raising groups, which allowed individuals to transform emotions 
into shared concerns, are not unique to social movements. Such resources are 
relatively common within liberal democracies. Even the more formalized aspects 
of democracy – such as general elections and referenda – provide factors that 
facilitate transformation of emotions, that is, affiliations, spaces, things, con-
cepts, and so on, through which (some) citizens can transform their emotions 
into political views and action in concert.
This feature of political space and discourse became patent in the period 
leading up to the British referendum on EU membership last year, an issue which 
became commonly known as Brexit. Now, according to cognitive scientists and 
political psychologists, emotions play a central part in all human decision-mak-
ing, not least when it comes to deciding whom or what to vote for. But in the 
Brexit debate, the role of emotions was more explicit. Campaigners on both sides 
seemed to talk about emotions incessantly (e.g. Brolin, 2016; Elliott, 2016; Heffer, 
2016; Johnson, 2016; Smyth, 2016). Whereas their opponents were ‘appealing 
to the baser instincts of voters’, they were ‘making the passionate case’ for their 
side (Heffer, 2016). Either way, a prominent school of thought held that ‘Brexit 
[was] not about facts, it [was] about feelings and emotions’ (Schama, 2016).9
The Brexit debate generated public discourses and spaces in which (many) 
people (but not all) could transform their anger, fear, and sadness into political 
views: for or against immigration, for or against supranational laws, for or against 
Brexit, and so on. Although the room for nuance or compromise within these 
spaces was generally narrow, perhaps even non-existent, many people (especially 
on the winning side) clearly felt empowered by the process and the outcome – to 
many on the Leave side it was after all a question of ‘taking back control’.
These initial remarks – which hopefully are not too controversial – are 
intended as a clarification of how I understand common political phenomena. 
As mentioned at the outset, I am interested primarily in what happens to our 
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capacity for political agency when negative emotions are medicalized. We shall 
see that the aftermath of the Brexit referendum provides an interesting case 
study through which to explore this question. I will argue that the medicali-
zation of emotional re-actions to the referendum undermined the actual and 
potential connections between emotions and political issues associated with 
Brexit, in some cases with the apparent intention of silencing dissent. That is, I 
am theorizing that medicalization in the post-referendum discourse had both 
immediate and long-term effects. The immediate effect was to undermine the 
political agency of some people with respect to Brexit and related issues. The 
more long-term effect was to reinforce politically disempowering factors that 
frustrate and sometimes even thwart the transformation of powerful negative 
emotions into public issues.
A brief note on method
The strong emotional overtones to the Brexit debate are what drew me to exam-
ine it in the first place, as part of a broader project exploring how the medical-
ization of negative emotions impacts political agency. I had reasons to expect 
a rich object of study, but could of course not be certain of what I would find 
and its relevance to the project. The process began with a search for the term 
‘Brexit’ together with some common mental disorder-words like ‘anxiety’ and 
‘depression’ in the ProQuest newspaper database. One of the first pieces that 
appeared in the search was a news article in The Evening Standard headlined 
‘“Brexit anxiety” brings queue of patients for psychiatrists’, published shortly after 
the referendum, along with a number of the newspaper articles that I discuss 
herein. I then attempted to follow the trail as I saw it: The news articles cited 
some mental health blogs to support their claims – what did these actually say, 
and were other mental health professionals writing similar things? Who else 
used the term ‘Brexit anxiety’, or other mental health terms in relation to Brexit, 
and for what purpose? Following the trail that the initial news articles set me 
upon, and answering these questions, led me beyond the initial resource to 
other publicly available materials, such as opinion pieces, blog posts, YouTube 
clips, and organizational documents. The result is the case study I present below, 
which highlights one strand of medicalizing discourse. This is not an attempt 
at quantitative analysis. Hence, my approach does not allow for any precise 
statement as to how important or prevalent the medicalizing discourse was 
overall in the EU referendum. It does, however, permit me to illustrate how 
this and similar strands of medicalizing discourse can impact political agency.
‘Doctor, I think everyone has Brexit anxiety’
The day after the EU referendum, on Friday, June 24, 2016, the votes had been 
counted and a winning side declared; 51.9% of voters opted for the UK to leave 
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the EU. London, Scotland, and Northern Ireland had overwhelmingly voted to 
remain, whereas much of non-metropolitan England and Wales voted to leave. 
Prime Minister David Cameron resigned in response to the defeat of the side he 
had led. In the days and weeks that followed, massive protests materialized on 
the streets of major cities in which people expressed sadness, fear, and, most 
prevalently, anger about the result and its potential consequences. These were 
people ready to act in the face of what many of them saw as a threat to the UK, 
Europe, and the world.
Though the referendum was over, critical political questions remained to be 
addressed. The most general and important of these was: What did Brexit actually 
mean? Despite this and other pressing issues, the new prime minister, Theresa 
May, her government, and its supporters appeared intent on challenging the 
legitimacy of any further debate or public involvement on Brexit. Differently 
put, they attempted to depoliticize Brexit, sometimes through methods both 
banal and absurd. Theresa May, for example, adopted the empty mantra: ‘Brexit 
means Brexit’. The intense and public emotions that had been generated in 
the preceding months potentially imperiled these efforts. However, as we shall 
see, this problem began to resolve itself as people began to claim that these 
emotions were perhaps not political after all.
Immediately after the EU referendum, the number of people in therapy was 
supposedly surging, according to news reports. Some individuals had appar-
ently been so upset by the referendum result that they required professional 
mental health care. A headline in The Sun claimed that psychiatrists had seen 
an ‘alarming rise in [the] number of patients seeking help for “Brexit anxiety”’ 
(Lockett, 2016). Another tabloid suggested that ‘Brexit anxiety’ had brought 
patients queuing for mental health care (Prynn, 2016).
Such assertions were not confined to the tabloids, although their claims were 
the most hyperbolic. The Guardian, The Financial Times and several other news 
outlets also suggested that the referendum had increased the demand for men-
tal health care (e.g. Court, 2016; Jacobs, 2016; Orbach, 2016; Watts, 2016). An 
opinion piece in The Daily Telegraph even implied that the increased pressure 
was pushing psychiatrists to the point of breaking (Fitzpatrick, 2016).
What evidence did they have to support these claims? Not much. Among the 
articles I have surveyed, only one cited evidence of an increase in patients. The 
article in question quoted a staff member at a private mental health institution 
in London, who claimed that a recent rise in patients was directly attributable 
to the referendum outcome (Moore-Bridger, 2016). Most other papers appear 
to have relied primarily on blog posts and opinion pieces written by mental 
health professionals.10 Among the most notable expert writers on this matter 
was the renowned feminist author and psychotherapist Susie Orbach. In a piece 
for The Guardian, headlined with her name and the phrase ‘in therapy, everyone 
wants to talk about Brexit’, she described the volatile emotions that her clients 
had expressed about the outcome of the referendum, such as anger, fear, and 
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– especially – anxiety (Orbach, 2016). Other mental health professionals related 
comparable experiences on their blogs and professional websites. But none of 
them mentioned anything to support the claim that the number of patients was 
surging. What some did report was that most of their existing patients wanted 
to talk about Brexit.
While the queues of psychiatric patients might have been a figment of the 
journalistic imagination, the idea of Brexit anxiety was not, or at least not entirely. 
The term seems to have first appeared in 2015, when it was used to describe the 
tendency of investors to withhold or withdraw investments from the UK due to 
the economic uncertainties that Brexit meant for businesses and the national 
economy. In this context, the word ‘anxiety’ evidently did not refer to any subjec-
tive experience we might have or to any mental disorder we might suffer from; 
rather, it served as a shorthand for a particular economic indicator, and this con-
tinued to be its primary usage in the months after the referendum.11 Arguably, 
however, this usage did not completely sever the word from its emotional and 
psychiatric connotations, which may be significant. Describing the economy 
using emotion terms like anxiety and fear can invite us to think of it as irrational, 
as Berezin (2009, pp. 335–337) has observed, or perhaps even as insane (Lewis, 
2008; cited in Berezin, 2009).12 When applied to the economy and other insti-
tutions that are usually surrounded by a façade of rationality, such terms may 
be politicizing and empowering. But these means are a  double-edged sword. 
Much like anxiety can open opportunities to intervene on institutions, it can 
open opportunities to intervene on individuals. And the move from thinking 
about institutions as irrational to thinking about individuals as irrational is an 
easy one; after all, if an institution is irrational does that not suggest that the 
individuals working within it are acting irrationally? Hence, the deployment of 
the term Brexit anxiety in the economic context seems in a sense to have paved 
the way for the explicitly medicalized meanings and force it assumed in the 
hands of mental health professionals.
The therapist’s guide to getting over Brexit
Throngs of experts jumped on the chance to offer their analyses of and advice 
on the mental health of the British population after the referendum (e.g. Burgess, 
2016; Cullen, 2016; Kurz, 2016; Private Psychiatry, 2016; Rowland, 2016; Sanderson, 
2016; Sieger, 2016; WPF Therapy, 2016). Of special interest were those who had 
voted to remain and found themselves on the losing side of one of the most 
emotional and vicious political campaigns in the history of British democracy, 
and who were consequently the most vulnerable to the so-called Brexit anxiety.
The apparent meaning of this term varied somewhat. Some experts deployed 
it to describe the worry that people might have about the consequences of 
the referendum. Others used it loosely to encompass a range of unpleasant 
emotions that people might feel due to the referendum, including anger, fear, 
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and sadness. Common among them was the idea that Brexit anxiety was an 
incipient form of mental disorder that needed to be managed to avoid serious 
health consequences. The emotional anxiety and depression people felt in the 
wake of Brexit were ‘symptoms’ that should not be ignored; as one for-profit 
psychiatry clinic urged on its website:
They are the biggest causes of mental health problems and one of the main rea-
sons patients come to our practice – they can even cause further problems with 
physical health if not recognised and treated properly. (Private Psychiatry, 2016)
Mental health experts were of course happy to offer their advice on how 
to manage these dangerous emotions – and those who worked at places like 
Private Psychiatry had a clear financial incentive for doing so.
Interesting from a political standpoint is that a central element in many Brexit 
anxiety management plans was the notion that the individual had to acknowl-
edge her lack of control in the face of Brexit, and to focus on ‘what really matters’ – 
like family and friends, as well as personal and professional success.13
Among the most colorful examples of this was a YouTube video in which 
a therapist showcased his avowed ability to help people to ‘get over Brexit’ 
using neuroscience-based hypnotherapy. The video shows a client, a mid-
dle-aged man, who begins by describing his anger over the referendum 
outcome. The man explains that he is distraught about the outcome of the 
referendum and how the Brexit debate has divided the country. Halfway 
through the video, we are to understand that treatment has transpired and 
the therapist prompts the man to explain how the treatment has helped 
him. The man responds:
It’s made me realise that I can’t do too much about it and it is really what it is. And 
we need to hope that things can become better. And for me to just accept it and 
let it go. (Cullen, 2016)
What is remarkable in this example is not the treatment, which is obviously 
outlandish. Most serious therapists, no matter how well-versed in neuroscience, 
would avoid claims that results like this were possible in a single session. What 
is striking rather is the patient’s response, which is portrayed as the ideal treat-
ment outcome: the patient has realized that he can do nothing about the state 
of the country; all he can do is to accept it and hope it gets better. Apparently, 
the cure for his troublesome feelings about the state of the public realm is the 
insight that he is politically impotent.
The effect of this and other Brexit anxiety management plans I have come 
across seems to be to reverse the transformation from subjective experience 
to public issue. They explicitly guide people to sever the connection they have 
made between their emotions and politics, under the premise that failure to 
do so may lead to serious disease. If we believed that our emotions were tied 
to Brexit and its consequences, we were mistaken. What we must understand, 
these experts urge us, is that politics is not the cause of our suffering: we are.
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Brexit anxiety off the couch
‘But what’s the problem?’ you might ask. ‘Few people read mental health blogs. 
Those who do read them probably have a history of mental health problems, and 
might be especially vulnerable to the emotional fallout of political events’. But as 
I have already noted, news media also picked up the idea of Brexit anxiety and 
warnings of other dangerous emotional (over-)reactions to the referendum from 
these experts, disseminating them far beyond the regular readership of therapy 
blogs. In some news articles, Brexit anxiety even evolved from an incipient if 
dangerous symptom to a full-blown disorder. For example, at the bottom of The 
Sun report on the ‘alarming’ spread of Brexit anxiety, an information box titled 
‘The Official NHS Doctors [sic] Guide to Anxiety’ provided a list of the symptoms 
and neurological causes of anxiety disorder (Lockett, 2016). In this way, The Sun 
and other publications also propagated the view that people had to manage 
their Brexit-related emotions carefully to avoid mental disorder.
Neither did these ideas merely bounce around in a media echo chamber. 
After the referendum, several organizations started offering special mental 
health support for staff who needed help to cope with Brexit. Some universities 
arranged group-counseling sessions for this purpose. For example, staff at the 
University of Nottingham who had ‘concerns about the potential changes fol-
lowing the Brexit decision and wish[ed] to enhance the ways in which they man-
age their own well-being’ could attend a half day workshop where they could 
learn ways ‘to navigate the uncertainties of political changes’ and ‘how to feel 
more in control when face[d] with uncertainty’ (The University of Nottingham, 
2016). In an analogous effort, the University of Leeds published on its website a 
guide for dealing with the emotional reactions to Brexit, such as grief, anger, and 
sadness. The ‘tools and strategies’ contained in the guide were, not surprisingly, 
almost identical to those we saw in the mental health blogs. They included: 
appreciating the things one has, limiting exposure to news, avoiding agitating 
situations, and paying careful attention to the signals and needs of one’s body 
(Staff Counselling & Psychological Support Service, 2016). Given this, it seems 
likely that the consequences of the medicalization of Brexit anxiety and other 
emotions extend beyond those with a history of mental disorder.
It is also important to note that one need not buy into these kinds of med-
icalized conceptions of emotions to be affected by them politically. Among 
some publications, the phenomenon of Brexit anxiety, the provision of therapy 
for those supposedly suffering from it, and the general use of a mental health 
vocabulary to describe the distress among Remain voters, became a means 
to delegitimize political opponents. After the referendum, the Daily Express 
and Breitbart, for instance, both highlighted conversations in online forums 
between young people who had voted to remain. Forum posts showed individ-
uals describing themselves as ‘grieving’, ‘sick’, and feeling ‘genuinely depressed’, 
leading the Daily Express (2016) to assert – without evidence – that thousands of 
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‘whinging students are complaining they’re suffering from depression’. Drawing 
on the same forum discussion, a Breitbart article proclaimed that ‘students 
“depressed” and “traumatised” by Brexit say they will fail exams’. The same article 
also accused students of holding ‘firmly anti-democratic views’ (Deacon, 2016).
Some politicians and pundits made similar claims. An NHS trust in southeast 
England was among the first workplaces to announce that it would provide free 
mental health support for staff emotionally affected by the outcome. Reacting 
to the announcement, the UKIP MEP Jane Collins called the initiative ‘an insult to 
democracy and an insult to people who expect their NHS to deliver healthcare 
for sick people not those having referendum-related tantrums’ (Stevens, 2016). 
Whereas mental health bloggers generally sought to characterize the emotional 
fallout on Brexit as shared by both sides, Collins had no time for such pretenses. 
In her view, it seems, only a loser would have reason to feel upset. Collins also 
stated plainly what Breitbart had implied: people who respond to Brexit with 
emotional tantrums of dislike are undermining British democracy and its core 
institutions. The previously mentioned initiatives at the universities of Leeds 
and Nottingham provoked comparable reactions when they came to light. A 
contributor on The Conservative Woman blog remarked:
Democracy has proven too hard to stomach for University of Nottingham academ-
ics[...] Sulking snowflakes will enhance their ‘skills for resilience in response to the 
Brexit decision’ by having half a day off work to sit in a room and moan about the 
grubby lower classes who upset them in June. (Anon, 2016)14
It is not that the harsh rhetoric and ad hominem attacks on people who 
voted to remain are surprising. Pundits of every stripe have been known to 
attack their opponents’ identities and right to a fair hearing instead of their 
arguments. The reason the attacks examined above are noteworthy is because 
they show how pundits have used the medicalization of post-Brexit emotions 
as a political weapon, deploying terms and ideas akin to those of mental health 
experts. Both the pundits and the experts claimed, in effect, that the strong 
emotions some people have experienced in the wake of the referendum are 
irrational or damaging feelings resulting from individual flaws rather than legit-
imate political concerns. And although therapists and pundits disagreed on the 
specific methods by which these individuals should overcome their flaws and 
what they should be called, their message is essentially the same: ‘Get over it. 
Move on’.
Conclusion
Earlier I proposed that democratic elections tend to generate resources through 
which individuals can transform emotions into public issues. This capacity to 
transform emotions, especially negative emotions, is central to political agency. 
The reason we decide to act politically is usually because we perceive some 
wrong in the world, something that evokes emotions such as sadness, fear, 
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or anger. If these emotions were not powerful, we would not act on them. 
Worryingly, it is precisely these kinds of powerful negative emotions that tend 
to be subject to medicalization.
The sort of discourse explored above, with the concept of Brexit anxiety 
at its center, interrupts or even reverses the transformation of emotions into 
public issues by calling into question the political meanings of our own and 
others’ emotions. Of course, doubts will always arise when we try to transform 
subjective experiences into shared terms – when we, so to speak, try to make 
the invisible appear. By exploring these experiences with others in relation to 
the world we have in common, to our political world, we can allay these doubts; 
together, we can identify the worldly causes of subjective suffering and act 
against them.
By transforming emotions into psychiatric symptoms or diagnoses, medical-
ization also allays doubts about subjective experience – probably much more 
effectively than the collective actions of regular citizens can. The authority of 
psychiatric explanation is so strong that it tends  to exclude any competing 
explanations, including political kinds. Indeed, my ongoing research indicates 
that points of view challenging the validity of particular psychiatric diagnoses 
or treatments are often labeled anti-psychiatry and, hence, anti-science – which 
is basically just a different term for irrational (Degerman, 2017b). Moreover, 
medicine and psychiatry generally asks us to look for problems in ourselves – or, 
preferably, to let experts do it – and to change ourselves through medications 
or therapy to deal with these problems. As we have seen, such treatment regi-
mens may be directly anti-political, asking patients to recognize their political 
impotence and to focus on their private sphere. That is to say, rather than guide 
us toward public issues, they drive us to conceive of our problems as – to borrow 
another term from Mills (1959, p. 8) – private troubles, which matter only to us 
and our doctor.
The Brexit anxiety discourse may not undermine the self-perceived right of 
campaigning political activists to participate in the political debate on Brexit, 
at least not directly. Few activists out on the street would buy into the view that 
they are suffering from mental problems as opposed to experiencing politically 
relevant and justified emotions. After all, in the immediate aftermath of the 
referendum, we saw large-scale protests, and since then groups have engaged 
in concerted actions on a smaller scale. Yet medicalized narratives can still sway 
those who occupy the middle ground, and exacerbate the rift between protes-
tors and ‘regular’ people who do want to ‘move on’ – or have heard that they 
should be moving on – with their lives. A companion mantra to ‘Brexit means 
Brexit’ has been ‘the British people want us to get on with Brexit’. To these peo-
ple, it may well seem that only mentally troubled individuals become so upset 
about politics that they take action, on the streets or elsewhere. Normal, healthy 
citizens do not cause a stir. They leave politics to the politicians. They keep calm 
and carry on.
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Notes
1.  The importance of emotional displays in politics is clearest in cases of failure. For 
example, John Kerry’s loss to George Bush in the 2004 US presidential election has 
been explained in terms of the former’s inability to convey emotional authenticity 
to voters (Berlant, 2005). Similarly, in UK snap general election of 2017, Theresa 
May was derided for her unemotional style, earning the moniker ‘Maybot’ in the 
media (e.g. Asthana & Mason, 2017). But there are also some notable cases of 
successful emotiveness in politics, such as Tony Blair’s emotion-laden speech 
at Princess Diana’s funeral in 1997, which, as one commentator put it, ‘set the 
tone’ and ‘laid the foundations for much more than the dignified burial of Diana’ 
(Braidotti, 1997; see also Dixon, 2015, p. 302).
2.  In his fascinating history of weeping in the UK, Thomas Dixon suggests that the 
death of Princess Diana was ‘the symbol and the harbinger of a new emotional 
era’ characterized by public displays of feeling (2015, p. 300).
3.  A useful definition of political agency should exclude some types of behavior 
even if they are concerted in some sense, such as playing team sports, walking 
to work, and so on. Some theorists may want to categorize these behaviors 
as incipiently political because they reproduce power structures. Walking to 
work, for example, can be said to sustain the political order since it involves 
people conforming to and performing norms in view of others. But while 
these and some other types of behavior might have political ramifications, 
there are good reasons to define political action narrowly enough to exclude 
them. One of these is that it seems desirable to have a definition of political 
agency that permits individuals to, in Arendt’s (1972, p. 206) words, ‘know 
when power is lying in the street and when they can pick it up’. An excessively 
broad conception of political agency, wherein everything is political – as 
postmodernist theorists often seems to suggest – can have the opposite effect, 
leaving individuals unable to perceive any opportunity for meaningful political 
action. The definition I have proposed therefore deliberately constrains the 
scope of political agency to apply to the capacity to act together with others 
specifically with regard to public issues. This implies that to act politically, an 
individual needs not only to perceive some matter as political, but also to 
have access to other people who perceive this matter as political as well and 
be willing to act with this individual.
4.  Pitkin (2006) also makes the connection between Arendt’s idea of political action 
and Mills’ concepts of public issues and private troubles.
5.  Medicalization, according to Conrad’s (1992, p. 209) widely used definition, is ‘a 
process by which nonmedical problems become defined and treated as medical 
problems, usually in terms of illness or disorders’. It can sometimes be difficult 
to say when a problem or experience has been ‘medicalized’. Medicalization is a 
dynamic process; it does not always occur top-down, although critics often try 
to depict it that way. As Conrad (2005) has emphasized in recent work, there are 
several engines of medicalization, including medical experts, but also grassroots 
groups and public figures. These engines sometimes work in different directions – 
one pushing for medicalization while another is resisting it. Neither the claims 
of some experts nor the assertions of a few media pundits show that a problem 
or emotion has been fully medicalized, and that is not my claim in this paper. 
Rather, my claim is that some negative emotions were subject to a multipronged 
discourse of medicalization, driven by several engines – mental health experts, 
journalists, pundits, politicians, and workplaces.
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6.  Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess was first published in English in 1957, but 
Arendt had completed most of the manuscript by 1938 (Young-Bruehl, 1982, 
p. 91).
7.  See note 6 above.
8.  For a longer consideration of Nussbaum’s argument about transition and 
anger, see my review of Anger and Forgiveness in Contemporary Political Theory 
(Degerman, 2017a).
9.  See also Reade (2016) and Mail on Sunday (2016).
10.  Several of the mental health blog posts that I cite here were also cited as the main 
sources for claims about surging patient numbers in the newspapers.
11.  A search in the ProQuest newspaper database, using the search string ‘“Brexit 
Anxiety” AND (psychological OR mental OR psychiatric OR therapy)’, indicates 
that Brexit anxiety was not used to describe individual mental health before 11 
July 2016.
12.  Interestingly, Berezin (2009) also highlights that the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index – which tracks volatility in the American stock market 
– is colloquially known as the ‘fear index’ among people in the finance industry 
and beyond.
13.  For example, Rowland (2016), Sanderson (2016), LeBon (2016), and Cullen (2016) 
all offer variations on this advice.
14.  For another similar example see Mikelionis (2016).
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